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Santa Cruz Biotechnology, dubbed, “the Walmart of biotech,” is one of the largest 
purveyors of antibodies in the U.S. biotech market. Until 2013, the company held tens 
of thousands of animals, including goats, rabbits, rats, mice and birds for the in vivo 
“harvesting” of antibodies. To produce antibodies, animals are injected with antigens 
that trigger the immune system. The animals’ blood is then drawn, and the antibodies 
isolated and sold to researchers.1 In addition to the large-scale confinement and 
harming of animals, the operation relies on animals’ natural resistance as a source of 
profit. Animals are thus at once vulnerable and resistant, a fact that shapes the violent 
mechanism used against them.   
 
Like all living beings, animals are temporal and finite: they are born, they live, and they 
die. This fact is mundane. In their peculiar relations to human beings, however—as 
agricultural, medical, symbolic and emotional fodder—animals are uniquely 
vulnerable. This, as the example of Santa Cruz Biotechnology shows, is a mundane if 
highly lucrative fact.  
 
The reality of animals’ lives and deaths concerns the duality of vulnerability as the 
condition of fragility and finitude shared by everything that lives, and as susceptibility 
and exposure to orchestrated violence that impacts on some lives more than others. In 
other words, vulnerability is universal but unequally distributed. This duality is not 
easily parsed. The tension inherent in the concept of vulnerability as something shared 
yet disproportionately endured animates the field of animal studies. To speak of the 
vulnerability of animals is not, then, to resort to convenient jargon. Animal 
vulnerability asks us to confront the host of phenomena, ideas, and sensations that 
define our living alongside animals, yet separately from them, in the midst of so great a 
violence that it has no clear beginning and end.  
 
As universal and shared, vulnerability blurs species distinctions since humans and 
nonhumans alike are subject to natural law, to injury and death. As purposeful and 
targeted, vulnerability singles out animals as vulnerable outliers at the mercy of 
mechanisms that serve and stimulate human desires and needs. Industrialized farming 
and medical research, for example, painstakingly refine specific physical and mental 
attributes in animals that render them more pliable and profitable commodities. If 
vulnerability connects humans and animals via our shared corporeality, it also sets 
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 1 Santa Cruz Biotechnology has a checkered history of grave violations of the federal Animal 
Welfare Act. Currently before the California Court of Appeal is a lawsuit brought by The Animal Legal 
Defense Fund for violations of the California Cruelty Code. See Cat Ferguson’s “Valuable Antibodies at a 
High Cost,” The New Yorker February 12, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/valuable-
antibodies-at-a-high-cost, accessed December 4 2016, and “Animal Advocates Appeal Case Against 
Santa Cruz Biotechnology, http://aldf.org/press-room/press-releases/animal-advocates-appeal-case-
against-santa-cruz-biotechnology-2/, accessed 4 December 2016.  
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animals apart from most humans most of the time in the scale and reach of the 
infliction of harm. This makes vulnerability an urgent critical site in which questions of 
cross-species ontology, ethics, and, policy intersect.   
 
The aim of this essay is twofold: to define and contextualize vulnerability and to 
explore the ramifications, and tensions, of vulnerability as a focal point of pro-animal 
thought. I begin by pointing out the explicit and implicit place of vulnerability in 
theories of animal liberation and in recent ethical philosophy that does not pertain 
directly to animals. My argument is, first, that despite their proximity, vulnerability and 
ethics are, in a sense, incompatible. The two are what Lissa McCulllough calls 
“correlative oppositions” (McCulllough 2014, 15). For not only does the state of being 
vulnerable not call forth any given ethical response, it may incite, indeed entrench, a 
recoiling from, even retaliation against the weak. Nevertheless, it is precisely this 
strange twinning, the correlation of opposites of vulnerability and violence that 
illuminates the lived intricacies of our dealings with other creatures. To think of 
vulnerability as a complicated site allows for a clearer understanding of the dynamics 
of power that brutalize animals. I will therefore insist throughout on the inextricability 
of vulnerability and violence, a connection that is reluctantly pondered by theorists 
and activists because it is too painful, seemingly hopeless, or inordinately dark. 
 
Emerging in the past two decades in fields as diverse as human rights, bioethics, 
philosophy and the social sciences, the discourse of vulnerability encompasses two 
main ideas: the state of exposure to injury and risk, and the understanding that in being 
exposed, individuals are mutually dependent. My discussion is restricted to those 
strands of theory and philosophy that have been most influential for animal studies, in 
particular those areas of inquiry that at the turn of the twenty-first century underwent a 
so-called “ethical turn,” inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in response 
to the modern perpetration of mass violence.  
 
Vulnerability and Animal Ethics 
 
It is possible to trace the notion of vulnerability across the field of pro-animal theory. In 
his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780-1823), Jeremy 
Bentham, philosopher, social reformer, and the founder of utilitarianism, declared 
pleasure and pain (not right and wrong) to be the guiding moral principles. In his oft 
cited passage on animals Bentham argued that feeling pain and the ability to suffer, not 
cognitive or discursive abilities, make animals morally significant. Following Bentham, 
Peter Singer argues in the utilitarian tradition that the morality of an action is 
determined by the balance of suffering and pleasure produced by the action, regardless 
of the species experiencing the pain or pleasure. But vulnerability is not reducible to 
the capacity to feel pain. Its remit is far wider.  
 
For Jacques Derrida, Bentham’s question marks a significant break in moral thinking: 
“‘Can they suffer?’ asks Bentham simply yet so profoundly…. the form of this question 
changes everything” (Derrida 2002, 396). The question, Derrida says, is “disturbed by 
a certain passivity.”  
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It bears witness, manifesting already, as question, the response that testifies to a 
sufferance, a passion, a not-being-able…. “Can they suffer?” amounts to asking 
“can they not be able?” And what of this inability [impouvoir]? What of the 
vulnerability felt on the basis of this inability? What is this nonpower at the 
heart of power?  (396) 
Susceptibility to suffering “changes everything” insofar as it does not provide new 
answers to old questions. The neural or mental fact of sentience is hardly the point. 
Vulnerability shifts the terms of the debate: it disrupts the familiar logic that grants 
animals moral consideration in accordance with certain innate capacities (to speak, to 
reason, even to suffer). In place of capacity, ability, capability—euphemisms of 
power—Bentham’s question introduces the notion of powerlessness, what Derrida 
enigmatically calls “nonpower.” Vulnerability as nonpower is not the absence of force, 
but its suspension. In the apparent paradox of a power-without-power lies the true 
radicalism of an ethics of vulnerability.  
  
Attention to vulnerability is also central to feminist care ethics and ecofeminist thought. 
Care ethicists and ecofeminists like Josephine Donovan, Carol J. Adams, Val 
Plumwood, and Marti Kheel avoid analytical quarrels “over what should constitute the 
basis of an appropriate ethics for the natural world” (Kheel 1993, 243). In place of 
general moral principles, these feminists propose a relational approach to ethics as “a 
natural outgrowth of how one views the self, including one’s relation to the rest of the 
world” (244). Not all animals are vulnerable in the same way all the time, and different 
cases require different responses, decisions taken from the ground up, as it were.  
  
In the tradition of care ethics, Lori Gruen’s approach is rooted not in abstract principles 
(the calculation of suffering or weighing of interests) but in the specificities of context 
and the cultivation of “caring perception,” which Gruen calls “entangled empathy” 
(Gruen 2015, 28). Here, the perception of vulnerability is part of one’s “moral 
experience” rather than an ethical rule that applies across the board of different 
situations. “Empathetic attunement or perception is directed toward the wellbeing of 
another” (45) in a particular situation and context. Empathy acknowledges the 
dependence and fragility of others, and by extension, our own.  
 
If entangled empathy is the concrete response to another’s vulnerability, how far could, 
or should, it be stretched? And what of the relation between vulnerability and 
violence? Might intimately linking vulnerability and violence itself betray a patriarchal 
worldview that overemphasizes aggression and domination and ignores the realities of 
empathy and cooperation?  
 
Precarious Creatureliness  
 
“To be a created thing,” writes the philosopher and mystic Simone Weil, “is not 
necessarily to be afflicted, but it is necessarily to be exposed to affliction” (Weil 1998, 
66). Creatureliness is an iteration of vulnerability as “a mark of existence” (Weil 2004, 
108). Weil’s work is devoted to the elucidation of vulnerability as a state of creaturely 
exposure and a gauge of reality. When someone is utterly vulnerable, they are stripped 
of the privileges of species and social rank. Although such stripping is often the result 
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of injustice, it invariably reveals the contingency of species identity (as well as the 
identities of race, gender, and class).  
 
Creaturely vulnerability opens up zones of “indistinction” (Calarco 2015), where 
species identities blur and where different beings, or creatures, are perceived as 
corporeal and vulnerable. More radically still, creaturely vulnerability, as I understand 
it, calls for the contraction of humanity rather than its benevolent extension to 
nonhumans. Creatureliness—the state of being exposed to natural necessity and the 
ravages of power—does not call for the alleviation of vulnerability via gestures of 
“humanization,” but for more profound forms of “dehumanization.”2 The creaturely, 
then, is focused on unseating the structures of human exceptionalism (less on the 
generation of empathy). By imbuing materialism with a sense of reverence for 
everything that is, creatureliness encompasses all life, from animals to plants.  
 
Creatureliness also informs the ways we think about art. In refusing the cliché of art as 
an expression of “the human condition,” that ill-begotten, passive-aggressive idiom 
desperate to shore up the human as a unique ontology, creaturely vulnerability sets 
into motion different modes of artistic expression, and crucially, an alternative poetics 
and critical practice rooted in what I have described as the contraction of humanism 
and an exploration of affliction (Pick 2011). 
 
No such contraction is found in Judith Butler’s influential work on “precariousness,” 
which, despite being anonymous and universal, remains the exclusive marker of 
human existence. For vulnerability to become such a marker is already to challenge 
deeply held beliefs on human prowess, and while Butler’s “new corporal humanism” 
(Murphy 2011, 589) is neither forthright nor sure-footed, it is expansively, not 
contractedly, humanistic. Though she does not specifically speak about animals, 
Butler’s telling omission can help to unsettle “the human condition” and draw 
attention to the mechanisms that brutally subject animal life. 
 
All lives are vulnerable, but the loss of some lives goes umourned. Butler’s Precarious 
Life (2004) and its companion piece, Frames of War (2009) explore the ideological 
apportioning of value that makes some lives matter, and others not: 
the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and 
must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and 
maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: what 
counts as a liveable life and a grievable death? (Butler 2004, xiv-xv) 
Butler is careful to avoid appealing to universal humanity as the source of value. “The 
point will be to ask how such norms [of what or who is human] operate to produce 
certain subjects as ‘recognizable’ persons and to make others decidedly more difficult 
to recognize” (Butler 2009, 6). Recognition is an act of framing by which those in the 
frame assume reality as living beings, while others are edited out: “the frame tends to 
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 2 The problem of violence cannot be understood solely as the result of a so-called “humanist 
deficit,” and the remedy to violence cannot, therefore, be more humanity. For a more sustained critique 
of the accepted wisdom that violence depends primarily on processes of “othering” and dehumanization 
see my essay “Turning to Animals Between Love and Law,” New Formations 76 (2012), pp. 68-85.   
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function... as an editorial embellishment of the image,” and “implicitly guides the 
interpretation” of what we see (Butler 2009, 8).  
  
Using Butler’s approach, it is clear how commonplace violence against animals 
remains invisible as violence. By framing animals as “food,” for example, we can go on 
killing and eating them and not see such killing as violence. The editorializing that 
removes animals from the epistemic, legal, and emotional frameworks that would 
make their lives matter ensures that violence continues and animals go ungrieved. 
Consequently, writes James Stanescu, “[t]hose of us who value the lives of other 
animals,” 
live in a strange, parallel world to that of other people. Every day we are 
reminded of the fact that we care for the existence of beings whom other people 
manage to ignore, to unsee and unhear as if the only traces of the beings’ lives 
are the parts of their bodies rendered into food: flesh transformed into meat. To 
tear up, or to have trouble functioning, to feel that moment of utter suffocation 
of being in a hall of death is something rendered completely socially 
unintelligible. (Stanescu 2012, 568) 
Vulnerability, then, does much more than argue for animal rights or the reduction of 
suffering. It brings another world into view in which animal are not food. As the frame 
shifts and perception transforms, different moral arguments are possible.  
  
Though Butler herself stops short of claiming that animal life, too, is grievable (Butler 
2009, 16), her work on precariousness and framing is central to the formulation of an 
inclusive ethics of vulnerability.3 Butler’s residual anthropocentrism aside, I want to 
reflect on her difficult pairing of vulnerability and violence.  
  
As a counter to acts of exclusionary framing that make some lives (white, male, human) 
matter, Butler offers an ethics of precariousness inspired by Emmanuel Levinas. For 
Levinas, the other person, in its very fragility, calls the self into being. In the sway of 
responsiveness to someone else, subjectivity forms. In this way, Levinas argues, the 
other precedes the self, and ethics—the primordial encounter with another—precedes 
ontology (my existence as an autonomous subject). Neither Levinas nor Butler 
envisages the self-other encounter as naturally harmonious. On the contrary, the threat 
of violence hangs over the encounter with alterity. Vulnerability is central to the 
encounter with the other, which, though wordless, Levinas subtitles with the words: 
“Thou shalt not kill.” To encounter another is to come into being via the threat of 
violence and the possibility of care. Like talk of “inalienable rights,” the prohibition on 
killing would be unnecessary if at the outset life were not already exposed to violence 
(and rights were precisely alienable). And so, for Levinas and Butler, vulnerability and 
violence are copresent.  
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 3 On Butler’s anthropocentrism, see Chloe Taylor’s “The Precarious Lives of Animals: Butler, 
Coetzee, and Animal Ethics” Philosophy Today 52.1 (2008), pp. 60-72, and Anat Pick’s “Animal Rights 
Documentaries, Organized Violence, and the Politics of Sight,” The Routledge Companion to Cinema 
and Politics. Yannis Tzioumakis and Claire Molloy, eds. New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 91-102. 
Stanescu offers a more favorable assessment of Butler’s contribution to animal ethics. 
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In Precarious Life, Butler spends some time on this problem. Why should the other’s 
vulnerability “prompt in anyone a lust for violence?” (Butler 2004, 136). Various 
explanations come to mind (self-preservation; fear of the other), but Butler concedes 
that Levinas “presumes that the desire to kill is primary in human beings” (137). In this 
view, vulnerability functions as a provocation and an invitation, and the relation 
between vulnerability and violence is tautological: for where else would violence turn 
if not toward vulnerability? This, it seems, is something that the political Left (and some 
in the animal movement), forever aghast at the crushing of the weak, has yet to fully 
grasp. Vulnerability offers violence the path of least resistance. To imagine the flow of 
violence in the other direction, toward power, is to imagine politics under the 
conditions of zero gravity.  
  
Animals are the clearest case of the doubling of vulnerability and violence. A 
nonviolent ethics of vulnerability that recognizes and grieves not just human but all life 
is one that recognizes the threat of violence wherever vulnerable life presents itself.  
 
Horrorism and Violence 
 
The philosopher Adriana Cavarero coined the neologism “horrorism” to name forms of 
contemporary political violence that she perceives as new: “a certain model of horror,” 
she writes, “is indispensible for understanding our present” (Cavarero 2009, 29).4 
Twentieth and twenty-first century political violence targets the most vulnerable, 
mainly unarmed civilians, whose destruction is not merely physical but ontological: an 
uprooting of the victims’ very humanity.  
  
“If we observe the scene of massacre from the point of view of the helpless victims 
rather than that of the warriors... the picture changes.... More than terror, what stands 
out is horror” (1). While terror is dynamic, prompting a flight for survival, horror is 
passive and petrifying, like the look of the mythical Medusa. Here, again, vulnerability 
and violence are strangely entwined: “[i]rremediably open to wounding and caring, the 
vulnerable one exists totally in the tension generated by this alterative” (30). Wherever 
there is need for care, there is already the potential for violence. The vulnerable body 
is the site of this tension.  
  
Vulnerability is an optic that conveys violence from the point of view of the victim:  
Today it is particularly senseless that the meaning of war and its horror… should 
still be entrusted to the perspective of the warrior.... The civilian victims, of 
whom the numbers of dead have soared from the Second World War on, do not 
share the desire to kill, much less the desire to get killed. (65) 
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 4 Cavarero’s Horrorism and Butler’s work on precarity and war can be compared to Steven 
Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Humanity and Violence (2012). All are attempts 
to come to terms with forms of contemporary violence in an era that seems, superficially at least, 
particularly volatile. In a section entitled “Animal Rights and the Decline of Cruelty to Animals” Pinker 
marshals familiar arguments against animal liberation and in favor of vague notions of animal welfare to 
support his thesis of modernity’s gradual reduction of violence (548-572). Although they differ markedly 
in their assessment of contemporary violence, Cavarero, Butler, and Pinker are also invested in 




Although Cavarero does not see animals as particularly vulnerable (“a child is the 
vulnerable being par excellence” [30]), horrorism aptly captures the ferocity and 
unilateralism of violence against animals as well as the ambivalence of killing and 
care.  
  
Yet to what extent does horrorism reveal something new about contemporary violence, 
especially once animals are brought into the mix? While horrorism offers a way of 
dealing not only with mass violence but with responses to it (Stanescu’s grocery store 
scenario is one example), other terms do similar work. Weil’s “affliction” describes 
states of profound vulnerability and violation. Like horrorism, the destruction wreaked 
in affliction is total: the afflicted person is not only physically damaged, but “loses half 
his soul” (Weil 1998, 41). For Cavarero, terrorism and war fail to properly address the 
nature of contemporary violence. While, in the case of human victims, a military focus 
risks obscuring the significance of violations incurred by civilians, in the case of 
animals, whose victimhood is profound but remains largely invisible, the frame of war 
has the opposite effect of brining violations into view. Derrida and J. M. Coezteee, 
among others, have described violence against animals as a war. But in The War 
Against Animals (2015), Dinesh Wadiwel provides a comprehensive exploration of the 
ramifications of animal vulnerability, intelligible precisely as war (See also Chapter 5).  
 
Vulnerability and Resistance 
 
In Elizabeth Bishop’s frequently anthologized “The Fish,” vulnerability arises in a state 
of conflict, and designates both violence and resistance. This tough-minded, deeply 
moving poem about a fish caught, observed, then returned to the water, pays close 
attention to bodily detail, its ethical coda a startling response to the facticity, or reality, 
of the titular fish.  
 
As the speaker pulls out the “tremendous fish” and holds it “beside the boat half out of 
water, with my hook fast in the corner of his mouth,” she takes her time, sadistically 
we might say, to peruse the physical minutia of the dying animal. There are the “the 
frightening gills, fresh and crisp with blood,” breathing in “the terrible oxygen.” 
Though initially the fish “didn’t fight. He hadn’t fought at all,” later the speaker notices 
the marks of past struggles: 
I admired his sullen face, 
the mechanism of his jaw, 
and then I saw 
that from his lower lip 
- if you could call it a lip 
grim, wet, and weaponlike, 
hung five old pieces of fish-line, 
or four and a wire leader 
with the swivel still attached, 
with all their five big hooks 
grown firmly in his mouth. 
A green line, frayed at the end 
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where he broke it, two heavier lines, 
and a fine black thread 
still crimped from the strain and snap 
when it broke and he got away. 
Like medals with their ribbons 
frayed and wavering, 
a five-haired beard of wisdom 
trailing from his aching jaw. 
 
Breaking the fishing line must have been excruciating, but the poem makes scant 
mention of suffering. Instead, what matters is the constellation of forces: the apparatus 
of fishing, the “battered” body of the fish, and the speaker-fisherwoman. Fish 
vulnerability and resistance go hand in hand. Although at certain moments the fish is 
personalized (“his sullen face”) the bulk of the poem is descriptive, and the situation 
that of war: the old fish lines are “weaponlike,” worn as military decorations. The fish’s 
past triumphs make his capture even more exhilarating: “victory filled up the little 
rented boat… until everything was rainbow, rainbow, rainbow!”  
  
Vulnerability in this case is not a prompt for humane treatment due to fish sentience. 
Instead, the activity of fishing itself confirms animal resistance. As Wadiwel points out, 
“[i]t is precisely because fish resist… that recreational fishing becomes a ‘sport’; since 
the supposed pleasure and art of these fishing practices relies upon the capture of an 
animal who eludes the recreational fisher, and will struggle against the line when 
hooked” (Wadiwel 2016, 208).  
  
The time that Bishop’s detailed descriptions require (in the real time of fishing and 
reading) makes the poem a ticking clock. By its end, we, too, are out of breath. The 
closing line—“And I let the fish go”— directly follows the speaker’s celebration of 
victory in the battle of fishing, and is a visceral relief. If it is possible to speak of 
empathy here, it’s of the respiratory kind. The poem’s surgical precision is the source of 
its ethical charge. When imagining the inside of the fish, “shiny entrails, and the pink 
swim-bladder like a big peony,” we are still on the outside, at the level of vulnerable 
but resilient flesh. The fish is let go. The poem ends. But compassion, too, is a winner’s 
whim.  
  
The most intriguing, and important, animal artworks are those, like Bishop’s poem, that 
capture something of the collision between human might and animal life, an encounter 
in which human dominance exercises its prerogative semi-automatically yet at the 
same time stands to discover, in the midst of power, its own contingency and 
automation, its own afflicted animality.  
  
J. M. Coeztee’s The Lives of Animals (1999) is a foundational text on vulnerability and 
affliction. In it, the elderly writer Elizabeth Costello grapples with the horrors of the 
reality of animals’ lives and deaths. Costello does not lay out a systematic argument 
about the rights of animals. Instead, she invokes animals’ aliveness, pitilessly 
extinguished on farms and biomedical facilities. Costello does not believe that violence 
is primarily a philosophical matter. “Philosophy can… no longer be seen as a mastery, 
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as a kind of clutching or grasping via analytical categories and concepts” (Wolfe 2008, 
8). But Costello seems on shaky ground. Her comparison between factory farming and 
the Nazi death camps meets with derision. Her belief in poetry’s capacity for 
“sympathetic imagination” (reminiscent of Gruen’s entangled empathy) is thought to 
lack analytical rigor.  
  
Part of what is dramatized in The Lives of Animals is the vulnerability of Costello’s 
stance on animal ethics: the somewhat vague appeal to animals’ lives over rights, the 
absence of clear concepts in support of animal protection, and Costello’s own 
inconsistencies (a vegetarian with leather shoes). As a text, The Lives of Animals is also 
vulnerable. Delivered as lectures by the real Coetzee at Princeton University, then 
published as a novella about lectures given by the fictional Costello at the made up 
Appleton College, we are never sure whether the views expressed in the piece are 
Costello’s or those of the author.  
  
Interpretive instability, the questioning of authority and mastery, and the anti-Platonic 
preference for poetic modes of address over philosophical argument is all cleverly 
metafictional, of course, but it is much more than that. For Cora Diamond, writing in 
Philosophy and Animal Life, the novella is concerned with the state of “a profound 
disturbance of soul” (Diamond 2008, 54). This is the real theme of the piece and it 
takes precedence over the question of the moral status of animals, and how we should 
treat them.  
  
Costello is a wounded creature. “What wounds this woman, what haunts her mind, is 
what we do to animals. This, in all its horror, is there, in our world. How is it possible 
to live in the face of it? And in the face of the fact that, for nearly everyone, it is as 
nothing, as the mere accepted background of life?” (47). This woundedness is also the 
weakens of Coetzee’s text. But the privation is really the heart of the work and a 
demonstration of the creative force of vulnerability.  
  
In arguing from a place of vulnerability, and in making a vulnerable argument The 
Lives of Animals avoids what Diamond calls “deflection”: philosophy’s fortifications 
against potentially unbearable realities. Deflection is “what happens when we are 
moved from the appreciation, or attempt at appreciation, of a difficulty of reality to a 
philosophical or moral problem apparently in the vicinity” (57). In the translation from 
concrete difficulty to abstract problem thought does not merely shield us from pain, but 
contributes to the sense of impregnability that has a hand in the creation of difficulty in 
the first place. Formulating a strong argument for a general case is satisfying (and 
elegant). But abstractions can harbor deflection. And where deflection lurks, we are 
also likely to find injustice.  
  
For Diamond (as for Gruen, Butler, and Cavarero) the work of philosophy and the work 
of critique must connect to the lived experience and embodied knowledge that guard 
against deflection: 
The awareness we each have of being a living body, being “alive to the world,” 
carries with it exposure to the bodily sense of vulnerability to death, sheer 
animal vulnerability, the vulnerability we share with them. This vulnerability is 
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capable of panicking us. To be able to acknowledge it at all, let alone as shared, 
is wounding; but acknowledging it as shared with other animals, in the presence 
of what we do to them, is capable not only of panicking one but also of 
isolating one…. Is there any difficulty in seeing why we should not prefer to 
return to moral debate, in which the livingness and death of animals enters as 
facts that we treat as relevant in this or that way, not as presences that may 
unseat reason? (Diamond 2008, 74) 
 
The Lives of Animals illustrates the meaning of vulnerability for thought as it struggles 
to take in reality. Coetzee’s text is the incarnation of vulnerability as critical practice.  
 
Beyond Vulnerability  
  
I have argued that in virtually all of their dealings with humans, animals are 
extraordinarily (yet mundanely) vulnerable. Animals are on the receiving end of 
violence exercised with the fewest moral, legal, and technical restrictions. As such, 
animals are outliers in the operation of power, and its most commonplace case. The 
few controls placed on inflicting “needless suffering” on animals are little more than 
window dressing, and this too in order to render animal use even more total and 
secure.  
  
There is a risk of becoming too attached to vulnerability as the sole prism for viewing 
animal life, reducing animals to the status of victims, adopting a paternalistic attitude 
with regard to their protection and welfare, and failing to offer workable alternatives to 
our current treatment of animals. To avoid these pitfalls, I have suggested that 
vulnerability be seen in the wider context of critiques of power, and in relation to the 
perpetration of violence. Vulnerability is not the absence of power but the product of 
relations of power. To speak of an ethics of vulnerability is to apprehend the ubiquity 
of power and imagine its suspension (as, in different ways, do Levinas, Derrida, and 
Weil).  
  
But most importantly, perhaps, vulnerability is the tug of reality, an attunement to “the 
difficulty of staying turned… toward flesh and blood” (Diamond 2008, 77). 
Acknowledging vulnerability in its three manifestations—a living body, a biopolitical 
resource, and a critical practice—chips away at established ways of thinking and 
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